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Abstract: Al will surely have an important impact on the 
management of future organizations. The problem now is to 
make some reasonable assessment of its promise and limita- 
tions, in order to direct research and development. Here we 
examine what an 'ideal' knowledge-based management informa- 
tion system could and could not do. The arguments are based 
on considerations of formal semantics. 
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The attempt here is to assess the impact of future A1 technology on 
organizational structures (and society). To avoid the weakness of mere 
opinion, we base the main part of the discussion on formal semantics. 
The major influence of computers in organizations at  present is in 
data processing or inform-ation systems. These provide access to one or 
more formatted databases containing data about the organization's plans, 
commitments and activities. The aspect we concentrate on here is the 
semantics of the data so maintained. 
The importance of semantics is to justify the inferences performed 
by the system. For example, if we have a general rule 
* hte.rnationa1 Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
and observe that  P(a), then (by modus ponens) we conclude $(a). How- 
ever, the t ru th  of (*) depends on the interpretation we assign to it. For 
example, if P is interpreted as lemon and Q is fruit, the inference holds. 
However, if Q has the interpretation vegetable, then the assertion is false 
and the  conclusion is incorrect. But these remarks depend on what we 
mean by 'lemon,' 'fruit,' and 'vegetables.' Thus, information system 
semantics relies (to a certain extent) on natural language semantics. 
For the inferences of the system to be valid, the semantics of its 
primitive terms must be stable. If Q means 'fruit' one day and 'vegetable' 
the next, the systems draws inconsistent conclusions. 
It is here that  we see an eventual limitation applications within Al for 
organizational information systems. Organizations, to  survive economi- 
cally, must change and adapt. This involves semantic change. To remain 
useful to  the organization, the information system will need to  be 
correspondingly modified. Of interest is whether, using some future tech- 
nology, these systems will be able to  modify themselves, adapting 
automatically as the organization adapts. The conclusions drawn are pes- 
simistic, a s  regards complete solutions, considering the semantic founda- 
tions of the subject matter.  
A more promising direction, we think, is in the perspective of so- 
called 'decision support systems' (DSS), where the semantic difficulties 
may be overcome through a cooperative, dialectical relationship between 
managers and machines. 
B. 'KNOWLEDGE-BASED' INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Database management, viewed abstractly and ignoring efficiency 
considerations, can be regarded as collections of logical assertions, for 
instance in a first order predicate calculus (see e.g., Gallaire and Minker 
1978, Gallaire e t al. 1981). Simultaneously, logic programming, based on 
a Horn clause form of the predicate calculus, is becoming popular as an 
A1 programming language (e.g., Clocksin and Mellish 1981, Coelho e t  al. 
1980, Kowalski 1979). 
Extrapolating these trends, we visualize the possibility of a 
'knowledge-based' information system. In this idealized image, the pro- 
grams and data of the entire information system are seen as a giant 
theorem prover, providing logically derived conclusions from observed 
facts about the organization and its environment. 
The question, then, is what are the possibilities of such a system? 
Would management cognition be superceded? 
An advantage of characterizing an information system as  a theorem 
prover operating on predicate calculus assertions, is that it brings the 
substantial literature on formal semantics to bear. 
In analyzing the semantics of a formal (predicate calculus) language, 
the assumption is generally made that semantics follows syntax. That is, 
the semantics of complex expressions is constructible from the seman- 
tics of its syntactic constituents. (Dowty e t  al. 1981:Ch. 2). This is 
Frege's 'Principle of Compositionality.'* The role of the usual logical con- 
nectives and quantifiers in constructing the semantics of first order 
assertions is well studied (van Fraassen 1971). What remains is the 
semantics of the open vocabulary of the logic, namely predicate names 
and logical constants. The approaches a t  this point divide roughly into 
two camps, what we will call the extens ional  and in t ens iona l  viewpoints. 
1. Extensional Semantics 
The extensional viewpoint is dominant in formal logic, originating 
mainly from the model theory of Tarski (1956). Here, individual objects 
are regarded as primitive, leaving generic properties and relationshps to 
be defined set theoretically. An interpretation or m o d e l ,  <D.F>, of a given 
(first order) predicate logic therefore begins with the assumption of a 
domain of individuals, D, and an  interpretation function, F, which maps 
logical constants to individuals in D,  1-place predicates to subsets of D, n- 
place predicates to relations on D, etc. 
This is entirely satisfactory as long a s  the population of individuals in 
D can be clearly specified, and they don't change. However, a problem 
for management applications is that organizations and their environ- 
ments do  change. Change is fundamental to economic growth; it  can't be 
ignored. An obvious step is to extend the model to include a time dimen- 
sion, T, so that D includes all individuals existing at  different times. 
Models of the language are  then of the form: 
Ths ,  however, encounters difficulties when we consider aspects of 
the f u t u r e .  Much of management is concerned with planning. Since 
there may be a variety of alternate or contingent plans, we must likewise 
consider multiple futures. Ths  leads to another extension to the model 
including so-called possible worlds, W, hence adopting models of the  form: 
Here we are speaking of formal, constructed languages. The principle of cornpositionality 
doesn't always hold in natural language, e.g., for proper nouns like 'Marilyn Monroe' or norni- 
nal compounds like 'red herring' where the referrent of the expression is not constructable 
from the referents of it's component words. 
This is essentially the ontology proposed by Montague (see Dowty et  
al. 1981, Lee 1981). While thls enables a mathematically elegant solution, 
the question is whether it is still semantics. If semantics is the 
correspondence between symbols and the world, but if the world is not 
merely the actual world (past and present) but also future and hypotheti- 
cal worlds, we have to consider how it is we know about these other 
worlds. Strawson (1959) points out that the principle basis for our shared 
epistemology is reference withn a common spatial/temporal framework. 
Possible worlds are mental constructions, Gedanken experiments. They 
are outside the framework of external reference and so are questionable 
as a basis for mutual understanding. We return to this problem shortly. 
2. Intensional Semantics 
The intensional viewpoint is I t h n k  more characteristic of the A1 
paradigm (especially semantic net representations). Here, it is not indi- 
vidual objects that are primitive, but rather generic properties and rela- 
tionships. Particular objects and events are seen as instances of these 
generic concepts. For example, we postulate primitive concepts, MALE, 
FEMALE, SPOUSE, CHILD and from these are able to define the entire 
vocabulary of kinship relations. Particular cases of family trees, etc. are 
regarded as 'instantiations' of these generic concepts. 
The intensional approach is entirely satisfactory for what we might 
call idealized or artificial subject domains, where the scope of variation is 
fixed theoretically or by explicit rules. However, the intensional 
approach also has difficulties, especially in describing real world domains 
where no theoretical foundation is to be found. 
For example, suppose we want to develop a concept, LEMON. Now we 
seek to elaborate the essential properties of lemons. Ths might be a pro- 
perty list somethng like: 
COLOR: YELLOW 
SHAPE: OVAL 
TEXTURE: BUMPY 
TASTE : ACID 
The problem, typically, with real world domains is that we can't simply 
define what a LEMON is, but rather our definition has to correspond to 
what the users of the system conceive lemons to be. Now we rum into the 
so-called 'criterial properties' problem. We want a set of properties that 
in conjunction uniquely selects out lemons and only lemons from the vari- 
ous objects in the environment. The problem here is twofold: that too 
many things qualify (e.g., yellow limes) and the definition excludes atypi- 
cal lemons (e.g., green lemons, lemons that aren't oval, etc.) Wittgenstein 
(1953/ 1958) is a classic elaboration of these &fficulties. 
There is an interesting relationship between the effectiveness of the 
intensional approach and the status of the science of that subject 
domain. Chemistry, for instance, provides a criterial definition for water 
(as HzO). Psychology, by contrast, has no criterial definitions for such 
phenomena as intelligence or creativity. 
The problem seems all the worse in the social/economic domains 
that are most common to  management problems. Consider for instance 
the mundane example of chairs. Is there a single physical characteristic 
that  chairs have in common? Consider such examples as rocking chairs, 
stuffed chairs, bean-bag chairs, plastic inflatable chairs. It seems that 
what is common to them all is not what they are, but what we do with 
them, namely sit. But this is no longer an actual property, but rather a 
propensity or disposition, which leads to similar epistemological difficul- 
ties as with possible worlds. (Rescher (1975:Ch.7) comments on disposi- 
tional properties and possible worlds.) 
D. A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SEMAlVI'ICS 
Both the extensional and intensional approaches to semantics suffer 
epistemological difficulties, especially in the social/economic domains 
typical for  management. Ths  leads to an examination of the mechanisms 
by which we come to know and use the terms of our everyday language. 
If we follow the extensional approach, then our main focus will be on 
our knowledge and identification of individuals (people and objects). This 
brings attention to the semantics of proper names and the identification 
codes we assign to machines and other objects. As Kent (1978) points 
out, these are of fundamental concern in data processing applications, 
mapping database records to inventory, equipment, personnel, custo- 
mers, suppliers, etc. 
How are these names associated to individuals? In the case of 
manufactured objects, quite often the identifying name is stamped 
directly on the object. In the case of names of persons and companies, 
the identification relies heavily on honest reporting of their names by the 
entities themselves, e.g., on employment applications, sales orders, etc. 
The point is that the organization doesn't have to  recognize  these indivi- 
duals through some collection of identifying properties, i t  is simply t o l d ,  
e.g., "I am John Doe," "Here is the XYZ company." 
The point applies much more broadly. Most of what we know about 
other individuals (people, places, thngs) that are temporally or geo- 
graphically distant is what we have been told. The proper name provides 
a tag to which various characteristics are attached. The names them- 
selves are passed from one person to the next in a series of 'causal 
chains' of reference, leading back to a &rect identification of the indivi- 
dual. Sometimes, in the case of multiple names for the same individual, 
the causal chains may separate, leading to assertions like 
"Mark Twain = Samuel Clemons" 
having an informative content rather than a tautological identity. 
Kripke (1971, 1972) applies this concept of causal chains in a forward 
fashion in characterizing possible wor1d.s. "Possible worlds are not far- 
away planets," they are rather c o n s t r u c t e d ,  based on known, actual refer- 
ences. Consider, for instance, a scenario beginning with the supposition 
that Ronald Reagan is bald. The question arises, how d.o you .know it's 
Ronald Reagan if, in this possible world, he has different properties. (We 
can exaggerate the case - suppose Ronald Reagan is really a robot, 
manufactured on Mars, etc. - this is called the 'problem of trans-world 
identification of individuals.') Kripke's point is that  we don't have to 
recognize Ronald Reagan in this world, we stipulate that he is the same in 
our construction of the scenario. The proper name Ronald Reagan is a 
'rigid designator.' 
Putnam (1970, 1978) suggests a somewhat similar explanation to our 
understanding of generic concepts like 'lemon' and 'chair. ' Consider the 
first example of 'lemons.' 
Being a poor cook, my concept of lemons is fairly rudimentary. I 
surely couldn't tell a lemon from a yellow lime. Yet I don't often make 
mistakes in shopping for them. How do I manage? I go to the super- 
market and look for the fruit section. There, typically, is a case labeled 
'lemons,' where I draw my selection. I rely heavily on the supermarket's 
knowledge to know what lemons are.  But how does the supermarket 
know? They make purchases orders to a distributor requesting shpment  
of 'lemons.' How does the distributor know? They order 'lemons' from 
certain fruit growers. How do the fruit growers know? Eventually the 
chain goes back to a botanist or agronomist who has certain scientific cri- 
teria for lemons. 
Now consider the concept, chair. Again we can follow the chain of 
reference back, t h s  time to certain chair manufacturing companies. But 
how do they know what a chair is? They specify that their products are 
chairs. Thus one enterprising company may stuff burlap bags with shred- 
ded Styrofoam and market it as a 'pillow chair.' Another might fold and 
paint pieces of cardboard selling them as 'throw-away chairs.' The suc- 
cess of their marketing also succeeds in modifying the concept of chair. 
The effect of these arguments is to introduce a sociological concep- 
tion of semantics, what Schwartz (1977) calls the 'new theory of refer- 
ence.' It gives a convincing account of why semantics is so difficult to  do 
computationally: semantics isn't fuzzy, it's social. For many of our 
terms, e.g., lemon, chair, the extension of the concept is quite exacting. 
A thing is a lemon (chair) or it is not. However, the cognition that  makes 
this descrimination is not an individual one, but rather a cooperation of a 
broad social network. As Putnam observes, we tend to regard words like 
hand tools that  we use ind.ividually. For many words, a more fitting meta- 
phor is to compare them to a big ocean liner that  requires a crew of hun- 
dreds for its operation. 
E. EXPERT SYSTEMS VS DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Expert systems are typically built to model individual expertise, e.g.,  
a doctor, a travel agent, an automechanic. The view, generally, is of an 
independently operating problem solver. Managers don't appear to be 
experts in th.is same sense. Mintzberg (1973), in an empirical study of the 
activitie's of high level executives, notes th.at a great portion of 
managerial activity is spent in communication, observation and data 
gathering. Moreover, some 70% of their time is spent in informal meet- 
ings and committees. Indeed, in this sample, managers only spen.t about 
22% of their time in isolated concentration. The suggestion here is that  
managers, rather than possessing an individualized expertise, are more 
like specialized nodes in a larger 'organizational cognition.' Organizations 
in turn,  react and participate in a larger 'social cognition' in their 
attempts to market new products and/or novel services. 
An important part  of the manager's activity is to observe and under- 
stand changes and trends in the market, the economic, legal and social 
environments. Much of this is not simply shf t s  in magnitude on pre- 
defined dimensional scales. (Were this so, mathematical models would 
surely have a bigger impact on managerial practice.) 
Instead, it often involves the modification of primitive concepts. For 
instance, the range of phenomena we call an 'automobile' changes from 
year to year. Each competitive innovation, each new marketing angle, 
each special interest group expands and re-organizes the phenomena the 
manager includes in his/her conceptual framework. And, given that  
his/her contact with the world is primarily through linguistic interac- 
tions, the semantics of organi.zationa1 language is constantly shifting. 
Because mechanical inference relies on a stable, fixed semantics, the 
utility of an  idealized, fully integrated, knowledge-based inference system 
will be limited to organizations in completely stable environments. Simi- 
lar criticisms can be made of bureaucratic rationalization (Lee 1980). 
The conclusion to be drawn is that integrated information systems 
will only be of use for those aspects of the organization's activities where 
semantic stability can be maintained. This conclusion corresponds to the 
empirical observations made by Gorry and Scott-Morton (1 971), which led 
to the conception of 'decision support systems' (e.g., Keen and Scott- 
Morton (1978), Bonczek e t  al. (1981), Fick and Sprague (1 980), Sol (1983). 
The basic idea here is to promote the development of technology 
which, rather than replace human cognition, seeks to assist and augment 
it. The trend seems to be towards developing DSS 'generators' which pro- 
vide computational build]-ng blocks whch can be variously structured for 
different ad-hoc decision situations. 
Interestingly, despite the widely recognized importance of group 
decision making, nearly all DSS packages are oriented towards assisting 
the individual manager in isolation. The explanation may be semantic: 
an individual can  a s s i g n  an interpretation to a particular syntactic 
representation (s)he invents. In a group setting however, the semantics 
is nego t ia t ed ,  and our technology so far seems to have had little effect on 
these socio-linguistic processes. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper has been mainly to elaborate a problem 
rather than propose specific solutions. The point certainly has n o t  been 
to discourage further A1 research. Rather, it may serve to explain some 
of the frustration felt in many of attempts a t  knowledge representation, 
particularly in managerial applications. As we suggest here, the problem 
may be overwhelmingly difficult, requiring ultimately a formal explication 
of all of society. If that is the case, we would do well to seek out more 
achievable goals and strategies. 
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